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Churchill is supposed to have character-
ized Russia as an enigma inside a riddle
wrapped in a mystery. This description
seems to apply-mutatis mutandis-to all
totalitarian systems; we know too little about
them. What is relatively accessible, however,
are their newspapers. Admittedly, the press
is not the most reliable source of information
in any social system but, with other avenues
of research often closed, it is especially in-
triguing to study newspapers, trying to make
them yield information and even predictions.
This study is an attempt to do just that by
considering the reaction of the East German
Communist party press to the refugee prob-
lem in the months before the building of the
Berlin Wall in 1961.’ It is a post-factum anal-
ysis, and the predictive power of the conclu-
sions drawn from the results is, of course,
limited to a narrow range of similar situations.
The hypotheses of this study rest on the as-
sumption that the German Democratic Re-
public is a modern industrialized state and
that the foremost aim of every state is its own
survival as a functioning social system
(Marschak, 1959). Janowitz (1957) charac-
terizes the state as a &dquo;territorially based
social system which monopolizes the use of
the instruments of violence for both internal
and external objectives&dquo; (p. 9). We assume
further that the modern industrialized state
takes the organizational form of a large-scale
bureaucratic organization and that principles
of organizational theory are applicable not
only to capitalist business enterprises but
Communist states as we11.2 2
A model for survival is specified by Caplow
(1953). According to his views, survival of an
organization is assured only if the organiza-
tion maintains a minimal level of efficiency
in its objective functions, and if conflicts can
be reduced to a tolerable level, i.e., to a level
which induces the members of the organiza-
tion to continue their participation in it. Ac-
cording to Etzioni (1961), social participation
is defined as the integration of the members
into the social structure, as well as their will-
ingness to fulfill objective functions within
that social structure. Likert (1959) states that
willingness to continue participation is as-
sured if interaction between member and
organization with its prospective costs and
rewards supports the individual’s sense of
personal worth. Simon, Smithburg, and
Thompson (1950) list conditions under which
an organization can induce its members to
continue participation, thus assuring the
survival of the organization: (a) A member
will continue his participation in an organi-
zation if the offered inducements are at least
1For a description of the event see Mueller and
Greiner (1969).
2For a more detailed exposition of the theoreti-
cal considerations, see Mueller and Greiner (1967).
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as large as the contributions demanded of
him. In order to determine this ratio, knowl-
edge of the values and attitudes of the mem-
bers is necessary, as well as knowledge of the
alternatives to participation. (b) The contri-
butions demanded from the members form
the pool from which the organization draws
inducements to further participation. Con-
sequently, an organization will be able to
exist only as long as sufficient contributions
are pooled. Only in this manner can induce-
ments be offered appealing enough to assure
further contributions. As Janowitz (1960)
and others emphasize, a complex social sys-
tem cannot assure such social participation
by the use of coercion alone. Because of size
and complexity and the prohibitive costs of
coercion, the modern industrialized state
cannot assure social participation without
using &dquo;manipulation&dquo; as a means of social
control. &dquo;Manipulation&dquo; will be defined here
as the use of techniques of social control that
leave the individual with a feeling of volun-
tary adjustment to the social system. Manipu-
lation will the better achieve this goal the
more it takes into account and considers the
wishes and problems of those from whom
contributions are expected. Only if such
wishes and problems are taken into account
can manipulation operate effectively by it-
self. The less it is possible to consider them,
the more necessary it is to augment manipu-
lative techniques by coercive measures. The
purpose of manipulation is a reduction in
the cost of social control, with outright coer-
cion assumed to be the most expensive form in
a modern industrialized state. Several effec-
tive manipulative techniques exist. The use of
social bribes, such as increasing one’s pres-
tige, can be labelled manipulation. In the
same way it is manipulation if-unknown to
the members-the state or any other organi-
zation structures the social and physical
environment in such a way that a certain kind
of behavior is the only one possible. A third
technique of social manipulation is the use of
propaganda, the use of controlled selection
and presentation of information as a means of
social control. The last-named technique con-
cerns us in this study.
On the basis of these assumptions and
their implications it seems justified to draw
the following conclusions: (1) Since the
modern industrialized state must try to con-
trol conflict through the use of manipulation
in preference to coercion, and since propa-
ganda is an instrument of manipulation, the
state will attempt to control an increase in
conflict endangering participation through
increased propaganda efforts. (2) Since the
modern industrialized state may be forced to
use coercion to assure its own survival, but
since coercion alone is assumed to be the most
expensive form of social control, the state will
try to combine coercion and manipulation in
such situations. The state will not take coer-
cive action without having readied its citizens
for such a measure by propagandistic prep-
aration. (3) Since the modern industrialized
state, even in a situation of unavoidable coer-
cion, cannot dispense with manipulation (at
least not with manipulation in the sense of
propagandistic preparation), and since an
increase in conflict will be accompanied by
increased efforts at control through propa-
ganda, intensity of propaganda becomes a
guide to the magnitude of social problems
even in situations of imminent coercion.
In order to investigate the validity of the
above conclusions in the context of this
study, several additional assumptions are
needed: (1) The building of the Berlin Wall
was a matter of survival for the GDR. (2)
The building of the Berlin Wall was an act of
coercion, not manipulation. (3) The stream
of refugees was an indicator of social con-
flict in the GDR. (4) The party newspaper
Neues Deutschland can be considered a propa-
ganda instrument of the state, i.e., it is di-
rectly available for the representation and
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furtherance of state interests.
Critics in the GDR who have questioned
the validity of these operationalizations have
labelled all but the fourth one as biased.
Nevertheless, we maintain their validity,
based on an extrapolation of the refugee
statistics and on statements in the Communist
party press itself. If one accepts these opera-
tional assumptions, then the following test-
able hypotheses seem justified:
( 1 ) The decision of the government of the
GDR to build the Berlin Wall will be pre-
ceded by a period in which the party news-
paper Neues Deutschland deals significantly
more frequently with the refugee problem
than in an earlier control period.
(2) The building of the Berlin Wall will
take place only after a period of increasingly
intense propagandistic preparation. Three
aspects of press activity will change as indi-
cators of propagandistic preparation: (a) the
attitude of the press toward the refugees be-
comes significantly more negative; (b) the
number of arguments that imply coercive ac-
tion increases significantly; (c) the number of
letters to the editor addressing themselves to
the refugee problem increases significantly.
(3) There will be a significant positive cor-
relation between the weekly number of ref-
ugees and the weekly number of lines dealing
with refugee problems in the party newspaper
Neues Deutschland.
Treatment of the Refugee Problem
before the Wall Decision
MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES IN THE YEARS
1950-1961
In our consideration of press activity we
will study the two years 1960 and 1961. It
may, however, help to establish a frame of
reference to review the movement of refugees
since 1950. Many thousands had left the
Soviet zone of occupation before 1950. As
a matter of fact, German migration began
even before the Russians arrived. In the be-
ginning there were occasional West German
or Allied efforts to curb this influx of then
unwanted manpower. Systematic record-
keeping started in the fall of 1949; 1950 is the
first complete year tabulated. During this en-
tire period there was some movement into the
Soviet zone of occupation and later into the
GDR, but these movements never even ap-
proached the magnitude of westbound
migrations.
Data covering migrations, found in the
following tables and figures, have been pro-
vided by the Bundesministerium f3r Vertrie-
bene in Bonn. The figures represent only the
number of persons asking for asylum in refu-
gee camps in Berlin, Giessen, and Uelzen, or
those who were referred to them. Although
these figures do represent the majority of
refugees, there is in addition an unknown
number of persons who successfully entered
West Germany via other than the official
channels. Table 1 shows the yearly number
TABLE 1
YEARLY NUMBER OF REFUGEES DURING
THE PERIOD 1950 TO 1961
of refugees since 1950; Figure 1 is a rough
graphic representation of the data in Table 1.
The migratory movement fluctuates greatly
but without showing a clear trend either up or
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FIG. 1. Graphic representation of the yearly movement of refugees from the GDR during the years 1950-
1961.
down.’ Absence of a unidirectional trend is
explained by the fluctuations in political and
social pressure. Thus the year 1953, with its
speed-up of collectivization in all branches of
the economy and its increase of the work
norms, produced the largest number of refu-
gees. In contrast the proclamation of the
&dquo;new course,&dquo; easing of pressure after the
revolt of June 17, 1953, and the comparatively
hopeful tenor of the meeting of the foreign
ministers in Berlin in February 1954 are ac-
companied by marked decreases in numbers
of refugees. The year 1955, in turn, brought
pressure against the church, recruiting drives
for service in the Volkspolizei (people’s po-
lice), and a series of economic bottlenecks
including shortages of consumer goods. Not
until 1958 are rationing cards abolished in
the GDR; that plus perhaps the &dquo;spirit of
Camp David&dquo; created by Khrushchev’s visit
to the United States may have given the
population in the GDR hope for an easing of
the pressure. In any case, the numbers of ref-
ugees in this and the following year are low.
But the final collectivization of all farmers
and heightened tension over the fate of Berlin
bring renewed increase in the movement of
refugees until August 13, 1961, the date for
the closing of the border to West Berlin.
Table 2 and the corresponding graphic
representation in Figure 2 show the monthly
numbers of refugees during 1960 and 1961.
Tables and figures illustrate seasonal fluctu-
ations within each year; the apex of the refu-
gee curve lies practically always in the summer
months, which may be due to better weather
conditions, but also to the fact that summer-
time is vacation time when it is easier to cam-
ouflage a flight as a vacation trip.
Figure 2, the graphic representation of
Table 2, shows the slow increase in the num-
ber of refugees during 1960 and the early
3This by itself poses an interesting problem. Why
was there&mdash;despite the improvement of conditions
in the GDR&mdash;a relatively constant number of per-
sons willing to leave?
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TABLE 2
MONTHLY NUMBER OF REFUGEES
IN THE TWO YEARS 1960 AND 1961
months of 1961 followed by a sudden and
decisive upswing in July of 1961.
TEST OF THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS:
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
The first hypothesis states that the govern-
ment decision to close the border will be pre-
ceded by a period of increased press activity.
The hypothesis rests on the assumption that
a complex industrialized social system will
choose the coercive solution to a problem
only after it has exhausted all possibilities
for manipulation. The attempt to stop the
stream of refugees through increased propa-
ganda in the press would be such a possibility
for manipulation.
l. Fixing the date of the government deci-
sion. In order to test the hypothesis it is first
necessary to fix a date for the decision to solve
the conflict by using coercive means. Such a
FIG. 2. Graphic representation of the monthly movement of refugees from the GDR during 1960 and 1961.
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date cannot be fixed with absolute precision.
There is not enough information available.
Furthermore, a decision of such risk, whose
consequences were hard to predict, is not a
point on a time scale but a developing process
of which we can at best fix the last step. If
one must choose a specific date, however, it
seems best to select March 16, 1961, when, as
far as the leadership of the GDR was con-
cerned, the decision to use coercion was made
during a meeting of the central committee of
the SED.4 4
2. Measuring the activity of the party press.
According to the hypothesis, then, the period
before March 16 should be characterized by a
noticeable preoccupation of the press with
the refugee problem. We chose as index of
this activity the number of lines of all
articles-or parts of articles-concerned
with the refugee problem in the leading party
newspaper Neues Deutschland.
Four groups of articles were considered
relevant: (1) Those addressing themselves
directly to the problem of westbound migra-
tions. (2) Articles about &dquo;Grenzgänger,&dquo; com-
muters who lived in East Berlin but worked
in the western sectors, thereby depriving the
GDR of much needed manpower. Grenz-
gänger also introduced ideas which were a
general source of irritation to the system.
Moreover, the differences in living standards
were constant propaganda for the West. (3)
Articles describing the sad fate of persons
having fled to the West. In this group belong
also articles reporting the return of refugees
who were disappointed with life in the Federal
Republic. (4) Articles concerned with the
reverse movement, migration from west to
east. These articles were included as indirect
arguments against westbound flights; life
there cannot be that much better if people
living it chose to come to the GDR.
Not included were articles dealing exclu-
sively with bad conditions of one sort or an-
other in West Germany without in any way
mentioning the refugee problem in any of the
four aspects listed. Also left out were articles
critical of the system-for example, criticisms
of the arrogant actions of bureaucrats, unless
these were tied directly to the refugee prob-
lem (as happened in rare instances).
This description of the categories of articles
considered refugee-related does not compre-
hend all possible or especially subtle ap-
proaches. Articles which on the surface speak
solely of the vices of the capitalist system in
West Germany might very well be intended as
arguments against a flight to the West. On
the other hand, articles describing the flight
of young men to the GDR who would escape
being drafted into the West German army,
which seem to warn against westbound mi-
gration, might have been intended as illus-
trations of the decay of the West German
system for which no one wants to fight.
There is no perfect solution to this problem.
Defining categories is often a somewhat arbi-
trary process. Thus it is the more essential
that the categories be reliably coded. This
seems to be the case. Correlation of the line
counts of two independent raters working
without knowledge of the hypothesis in a
check period (January/February and May/
June 1961) is r = 0.80. Correcting this corre-
lation coefficient by the use of the Spearman-
Brown formula results in an estimated reli-
ability of 0.89.
In addition to the number of lines, we con-
sidered the simple number of refugee-related
articles, variability of weekly line counts,
and the kind of argumentation used-i.e.,
whether the articles were addressing them-
selves to the refugee problem directly (cate-
gories 1 and 2) or only indirectly (categories
3 and 4). Thus we hoped to assess not only
the increased level but also the concentration
of approach, both of which gave the press
activity the character of a planned newspaper
campaign.
3. Determining length and position of the4See Der Spiegel, 1966, No. 34, p. 26.
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test-period. The time period to be investigated
before the decision date is referred to as the
test-period. A sequence of ten weeks was de-
termined for its length, since a span of time
two and a half months long seemed sufficient
to detect the workings of a press campaign if
one existed.
Some difficulty was caused by the question
where to locate this test-period. How much
before is &dquo;before?&dquo; Should one count back
ten weeks from the week of decision? Or
should one assume that the campaign started
still earlier and had already run its course by
March 16? Or could it be that the press cam-
paign would run beyond any decision date
through sheer inertia of planning?
To reduce uncertainty the following ques-
tion was raised: Does the test-period differ
from periods of equal length before and after
it with respect to the intensity of newspaper
activity? Table 3 gives the relevant informa-
tion about the three time spans in question.
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF THE INDICES OF PRESS
ACTIVITY BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER
THE TEST-PERIOD
A comparison of the line counts in the
three periods, using the Kruskal-Wallis test
(Lienert, 1962), does not show any significant
differences (H = 2.53, p > 0.05).5 Variability
of the weekly sums of newspaper lines is also
not significantly different in the three periods
when using the Kamat test (Kab = 13, Køc = 9,
Kbc = 14, all p > 0.05; Lienert, 1962). The
number of articles, however, is not equally
distributed over the three periods (chi2 = 8.31,
p < 0.05). The number of articles in the time
span labelled &dquo;post-period&dquo; is significantly
smaller than the number of articles in the pre-
period (chi2 = 8.20, p < 0.01). Pre-period
and test-period do not differ significantly
from each other (chi2 = 2.22, p > 0.05). Test-
period and post-period also show no signifi-
cant difference (chi2 = 1.94, p > 0.05).
Tendencies toward a greater number of
articles as well as a greater number of lines
might speak for the choice of this earlier pe-
riod as test-period. On the other hand, the
tendency toward reduced variability suggests
the period January 2 to March 12, 1961 as
test-period. There is no indication that a
press campaign gained momentum only after
the decision had been made. On the contrary,
there is a tendency toward a decrease in press
activity in the post-period. Since it seemed
less arbitrary to interpret &dquo;before&dquo; as &dquo;di-
rectly before&dquo; and since originally, before
perusal of the data, the period January 2 to
March 12, 1961 was chosen as the test-period,
and since finally no significant arguments
seem to speak against it, it was decided to re-
tain the test-period as originally proposed.
Any other interpretation harbors the danger
of working in favor of the hypothesis by mov-
ing the test-period to where it seems most
convincing.
4. Choosing the control period. There re-
mains the question, with what time span
should the test-period be compared? It does
not seem advisable to choose any time after
the decision date, since the objective of the
propaganda might change. We assumed that
the main objective of propaganda released
before the decision would be to influence the
behavior of the population, to contain migra-
tion. After it had been made, the main objec-
tive might shift to preparing the people for
some future action and to anticipate negative
5The use, where possible, of nonparametric sta-
tistics seems advisable since it cannot be assumed
that refugee-related articles are normally dis-
tributed.
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reaction by an attempt to justify the intended
and decided-upon action. We chose a ten-
week span of time in 1960, so that the weekly
numbers of refugees would be roughly com-
parable to those of the test-period. This,
then, is the period from March 7 to May 15,
1960. The average weekly number of refugees
during this period is 3,735-not significantly
different from the test-period weekly average
of 3,660 (t = 0.15, p > 0.05). The t-test for
uncorrelated means served as statistical test
(Guilford, 1956). Variances of the weekly
numbers of refugees do not differ significantly
from each other according to the F-test of dif-
ferences between variances (F9.9 = 2.15, p >
0.05; Guilford, 1956). In all other respects
nothing seems to speak against choosing this
span as a control period. The volume of news-
print in both periods is comparable, and
average number of pages per newspaper-
circa six pages-does not seem to differ be-
tween the two periods in any way worth
mentioning. Furthermore, there does not
seem to be any difference between the two
periods with respect to the attention that is
absorbed by other campaigns or special daily
events.
5. Procedure. Necessary volumes of the
leading party newspaper of the SED, the daily
Neues Deutschland, were available from the
Department of Journalism at the Universitat
Mvnster. Several missing issues were found
and checked at the Institüt f3r Zeitungswis-
senschaft in Dortmund.~ The first step of
analysis consisted of identifying all the
refugee-related articles or parts of articles
and listing them in a prepared form. An ex-





One line in the Neues Deutschland con-
tains, on the average, 5.5 words. Headlines
were added to the line count on this basis.
Pictures were not transformed into line
equivalents; only their captions were used.’
TEST OF THE FIRST HYPOTHESIS:
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the statistical test are given in
Table 5, which compares not only control-
6A characterization of Neues Deutschland is to
be found in Herrmann (1963).
7A complete listing of all articles used in this
study is given in Mueller and Greiner (1969).
TABLE 5
COMPARISON OF LINE COUNT, NUMBER OF ARTICLES, AND VARIABILITY OF LINE
COUNT IN TEST-PERIOD, PRE-PERIOD, AND CONTROL-PERIOD
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period and test-period but also control-
period and pre-period to indicate how the
results would be altered by a different posi-
tioning of the test-period. The tests of signif-
icance used were the chi-square test, the
Mann-Whitney U-test, and the Kamat test
(Lienert, 1962).
Statistical tests do not show any significant
differences between the periods with respect
to the number of lines and the variability of
the weekly line counts. Nor does the number
of articles in the test-period differ from that
in the control-period. Only the number of
articles in the pre-period is significantly
greater than in the control-period.
To further clarify whether government
decision was preceded by a press campaign,
a qualitative index is used: the percentage
of arguments dealing directly with the refu-
gee problem. Arguments are called direct if
they are concerned with migration from east
to west and its causes and consequences (cate-
gories 1 and 2). All other arguments are in-
direct (categories 3 and 4). Table 6 presents
these data and sets them in relation to the
argumentation used in the last ten weeks be-
fore the closing of the border. This period is
labelled &dquo;end-period.&dquo;
Table 6 shows two things: (1) lack of di-
rect approach to the problem is practically
the same in the first three periods, and (2)
TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF THE PERCENTAGE
OF ARTICLES WITH DIRECT
ARGUMENTATION IN THE
VARIOUS TIME PERIODS
there is a marked difference in approach be-
tween the first three periods and the end-
period. Only during the end-period is there a
direct attack on the problem.
Finally, it might help to present the weekly
line counts of all five periods in graphic
form; this is done in Figure 3, showing that
what differences might seem to exist in the
early periods are small as compared with the
differences between earlier periods and the
end-period.
Taking all these results together, it seems
justified to say the following: Although there
is a tendency toward increased press activity
before the date of government decision and
for a decrease directly thereafter, it is not pos-
sible to secure this tendency statistically using
as indices of press activity the number of lines
and the variability of weekly line counts. If
one adds to this a qualitative impression
about the similarity of argumentation, it does
not seem justified to speak of a press cam-
paign preceding the decision to use violence.
Accordingly, in the later interpretation of all
the data, we will proceed on the assumption
that this hypothesis cannot be confirmed.
Propagandistic Preparation of the
Wall-Building
The second hypothesis assumed that the
building of the Wall could take place only
after a period of propagandistic preparation
and justification, since a complex industrial-
ized system would have to try to combine
the use of coercive means with manipulation
in order to reduce costs of social control. To
test this hypothesis it was stated that three
aspects of press activity should change in the
period before the date of action: (1) the atti-
tude toward the refugees and the Grenz-
gänger, (2) the frequency of arguments that
imply and &dquo;justify&dquo; the use of coercive means,
and (3) the number of letters to the editor
addressing themselves to the refugee problem.
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FIG. 3. Graphic representation of the weekly line counts of refugee-related articles in five ten-week periods.
CHANGE IN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE
REFUGEES: METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
I. What span of time should be studied? The
question of when to begin an analysis of the
government’s attitude toward the refugees
was linked to their numbers. It seems reason-
able to expect a change in attitude as the
social situation changes. Thus it was decided
to begin the investigation of press arguments
two months before the generally increasing
trend in number of refugees took a decisive
upswing. To choose two months is arbitrary
but such a time span seemed long enough to
establish a base line against which changes
could be assessed. Figure 2 shows a decisive
increase in number of refugees from June to
July of 1961. Given the magnitude of the in-
crease it seemed unnecessary to apply a statis-
tical test. Thus the beginning date of the
qualitative analysis of the press is May 1,
1961.
The period from May 1 to August 13 was
divided into three sections: (1) from May I
to June 30, (2) from July 1 to July 31, and
(3) from August 1 to August 13.
2. What method of content analysis should
be used? Osgood’s method of &dquo;evaluative as-
sertion analysis&dquo; (Osgood, 1959) was chosen.
This procedure allows the drawing of infer-
ences about the attitude of a source toward
various social objects, e.g., countries, people,
political decisions. It helps to code valuations
contained in value-laden concepts in news-
paper statements according to specified rules
which increase the objectivity of the analysis.
The method tries to immunize the rater
against the positive or negative influences that
the content of a statement may exert. The
analysis begins with the selection of raw state-
ments from a given source and ends with the
positioning of the attitude objects on a value
scale ranging from +3 to -3. It proceeds in
several steps:
(1) Identification of all concepts that might
elicit attitudinal reactions in the reader in
connection with a given topic. For example,
in the sentence: &dquo;To become a refugee from
the GDR means working for war,&dquo; the words
&dquo;refugee&dquo; and &dquo;GDR&dquo; and &dquo;war&dquo; would
elicit attitudinal reactions.
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(2) In a second step the complex sentences
in the source are reformulated as a series of
short statements consisting of subject, predi-
cate, and object. For example, the sentence:
&dquo;Although Pfeifer [a refugee] supported the
SED’s fight against crime in West Germany,
he did not vote for the SED in 1948,&dquo; would
be broken into the following statements: (a)
West Germany/has/crime; (b) SED/fights
against/crime; (c) SED/is/a fighter; (d)
Pfeifer/supported/SED’s fight; and (e) Pfeifer/
did not vote for/SED.
(3) In a third step these statements are
evaluated with respect to the direction and
intensity of the valuation expressed in them.
The decision whether a valuation is positive
or negative is in most cases easy to make. For
the attribution of intensity, Osgood offers
rules such as that verbs like &dquo;to be&dquo; or &dquo;to
have&dquo; express high intensity, while the condi-
tional &dquo;might&dquo; or &dquo;should&dquo; express low in-
tensity. For example, the sentence: &dquo;The West
German capitalists have exploited the deepest
human emotions,&dquo; would become: West Ger-
man capitalists/have exploited/ -2/deepest
emotions/+3.
(4) In a final step the numerical expres-
sions for the evaluative statements are sum-
med and weighted by the intensity of the
assertion to yield an index for the position on
the value scale.8
3. What kind of newspaper material should
be used? Not all newspaper articles are suited
for this kind of analysis. Only programmatic
articles, essays, satires, and strongly opin-
ionated news items can be used. Straight
news, and the simple reporting of facts, are
not suited for the application of this method
although they too, of course, often contain an
implicit valuation.
In the first evaluation period of May 1 to
June 30 all suitable articles were used. The
total sum of lines in these articles was 764.
The other two periods offered more material
than could be mastered. Of the usable mate-
rial from these periods, articles were selected
at random until a comparable number of lines
was reached. In the second evaluation period,
eight out of 22 usable articles were randomly
selected with a total number of 766 lines. In
the third evaluation period, nine out of 67
usable articles were selected with 762 as the
total number of lines. Table 7 has these data
and shows the percentage of articles with
value judgments increases significantly in the
course of the three periods (chi2 =11.94, p <
0.01). In other words, the press takes an in-
creasingly more engaged position.
TABLE 7
PRESENTATION OF THE NUMBER OF ARTICLES
USED IN THE EVALUATIVE ASSERTION
ANALYSIS IN THE THREE EVALUATION
PERIODS
4. Categories used in the evaluative asser-
tion analysis. With respect to which categories
was the newspaper material evaluated? On the
basis of our impressions from the reading of
Neues Deutschland, we chose six categories
which (1) seemed relevant to the refugee prob-
lem and (2) could be expected to elicit specific
attitudinal reactions in other readers, too.
Our list of categories does not claim to be
exhaustive:
(a) Socialism. In this category belong all
mentionings of the word &dquo;socialism&dquo; itself
as well as all combinations like &dquo;socialist
order&dquo; or &dquo;socialistic idea&dquo; that seem to per-
tain to socialism as a political ideology or as
the idea of a certain kind of social organiza-
tion. Not counted were statements referring to
the GDR as a state.
8The evaluative assertion analysis of this mate-
rial is presented in detail and consecutively in
Mueller and Greiner (1967).
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For the test of Hypothesis 2a the category
&dquo;refugee&dquo; is the essential one. For method-
ological reasons, but also in order to put this
category into perspective, it was necessary to
determine several categories.
The evaluative assertion analysis was done
by two independent raters, one of whom did
not know the date of the articles to be rated.
The correlation between these two ratings is
r = 0.95. Correcting this correlation coef-
ficient by the use of the Spearman-Brown
formula gives an estimated reliability of 0.97,.
which seems very high indeed. It should be
pointed out that the articles to be rated were
selected beforehand. Thus it was clear from
the beginning that they would contain evalu-
ative material related to the categories. This
seems, however, entirely appropriate, since
what was to be checked was not the reliability
of selecting refugee-related articles but the
use of a certain method of content analysis.
Furthermore, the independent ratings were
preceded by an intensive training period. All
data relevant to the assessment of reliability
are presented in Table 8.
TABLE 8
PRESENTATION OF DATA RELEVANT TO THE
ASSESSMENT OF RELIABILITY OF THE
EVALUATIVE ASSERTION ANALYSIS
(b) GDR. This category was coded when a
statement referred to the real state as com-
pared to the intended social order. In 1961
this distinction was still explicitly made. At
that point the GDR was not yet supposed to
have achieved full socialism. It was &dquo;on the
way toward socialism.&dquo; In this category,
then, are articles about politicians, institu-
tions as parts of the state, East Berlin as a
capital, and citizens of the GDR.
(c) Federal Republic of Germany. The dis-
tinction between actual state and intended
social order does not apply to this category
or to USA and &dquo;West Berlin,&dquo; which follow.
This distinction, clearly acknowledged in
relation to the GDR, is not made when the
press speaks about West Germany. The state-
ments &dquo;capitalist system of exploitation&dquo; and
&dquo;Federal Republic&dquo; are one as far as evalu-
ation is concerned. Thus two kinds of state-
ments make up this category-statements
about the social system in West Germany and
statements about the political organization
of this area.
(d) USA. What was said above about the
Federal Republic of Germany applies here.
(e) West Berlin. The same as (d).
(f) Refugee. Under this category fall not
only statements referring to persons who have
left the GDR forever, but also statements
referring to the Grenzgänger, persons who
live in East Berlin but work in Western sec-
tors. The reason for this equal treatment was




I. Attitude change during the three evalu-
ation periods. The position of the attitude
objects on the value scale in the three periods
and changes in these positions are presented
in Table 9. As could be expected, the attitude
objects &dquo;socialism&dquo; and &dquo;GDR&dquo; have a
highly valued position on the scale while
&dquo;GFR&dquo; and &dquo;USA&dquo; and &dquo;West Berlin&dquo; are
negatively valued. It should be noted that the
position of these five attitude objects hardly
changes. Only the category &dquo;Refugee&dquo; shows
a more noticeable trend. From a position of
-1.4 during the period May-June, the valu-
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TABLE 9
VALUATION OF THE SIX ATTITUDE OBJECTS
DURING THE THREE EVALUATION PERIODS
ation sinks on the seven-point scale to -2.5
in July, and to -2.8 in August.
Figure 4 illustrates the same data graphi-
cally. Is this change in attitude statistically
significant? Difficulty in testing lies in the
fact that the individual statements are not
independent of each other. On the other
hand, if one wants to assume that the articles
are independent of each other, the difficulty
then is that some articles contain more state-
ments about refugees than others, thus re-
sulting in an unequal stability of data. To cor-
rect this to some degree, articles whose atti-
tude rating depended upon fewer than three
statements were left out. Thus, three articles
had to be eliminated-two in the second
evaluation period, one in the third. The sig-
nificance of the differences in central tendency
between the periods was assessed by the
Kruskal-Wallis test (Lienert, 1962). The re-
sult of the test was significant (H~o~~ = 5.89,
p < 0.05). It should, however, be interpreted
conservatively because of the manipulation of
data.
2. Description of the attitude of the press
toward the refugee problem in the three evalu-
ation periods. For the first period (May-June),
the attitude toward the refugees in this period
is best expressed in the article &dquo;Offener Brief
an einen Republikfl3chtigen.&dquo; The emotional
tone is only moderately negative, the argu-
FIG. 4. Graphic representation of attitude changes in Neues Deutschland toward the
six attitude objects in the three evaluation periods.
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mentation relatively detached and by no
means one-sided. The act is condemned but
not the actor. The two adjectives &dquo;foolish&dquo;
and &dquo;short-sighted&dquo; characterize best the
attitude of Neues Deutschland toward the
refugees in this period. The refugees are de-
scribed as men and women who run blindly
to their doom and often return, their illusions
about the &dquo;golden West&dquo; shattered.
To &dquo;prove&dquo; this point, most of the articles
speak about the sad fate of refugees in the
West or about the people who moved from
West Germany to the GDR. Two articles of
substantial length &dquo;inform&dquo; the reader of the
dirty methods of seduction (Abwerbung) used
by the CIA and the West German political
police (Verfassungsschutz) to entice people to
come to their side. Both articles seem to
argue indirectly against flight by pointing
out the dangers awaiting westbound refugees.
To summarize the tenor of the articles in this
period: The horrors of the West will be chosen
only by those who are not able to think
properly. This is, unchanged, the same propa-
ganda line that characterized the earlier
periods investigated in connection with test-
ing the first hypothesis.
For the second period (July), the attitude
score for the category &dquo;refugee&dquo; is -2.5 in
this period, a marked decrease as compared
with the -1.4 position in May and June. The
numerical score reflects the increased hostil-
ity against the Grenzgänger. The press begins
to make this group the scapegoat for many
of the regime’s internal difficulties. No longer
are they characterized solely as acting fool-
ishly and unthinkingly; now they are traitors
to the working class, pursuing egotistical
goals and exploiting the achievements of the
GDR by harvesting where they haven’t sown.
They are accused of introducing social un-
rest through slanderous propaganda and of
creating shortages by buying up durable con-
sumer goods. (The purchasing power of the
Grenzgänger was indeed unreasonably high
because the exchange rate between the
Deutschmark-West and the Deutschmark-
East [SchwindelkursJ was always in their
favor.)
Hand in hand with this attitude change
goes an increase in the valuation of the cate-
gory &dquo;GDR&dquo; and a decreased evaluation of
the categories &dquo;GFR&dquo; and &dquo;USA&dquo; and &dquo;West
Berlin.&dquo; Here appears what is often found in
times of turmoil: polarization of attitudes,
revaluation of one’s own system, and devalu-
ation of the groups with which there is
conflict.
Summarized, the themes of this period are
(a) increased attacks against the West, (b)
condemnation of the Grenzgänger as traitor,
and (c) first letters to the editor demanding
drastic measures.
For the third period (August), the analysis
brings a further worsening of attitude toward
the refugees (-2.8). Condemnation of the
Grenzgänger and the refugees takes even more
extreme forms. Current articles describe the
refugee as a common criminal who abandons
his children. The Grenzgänger becomes an
enemy of the state who produces weapons for
the West German warmongers. The valuation
of the categories &dquo;GFR&dquo; and &dquo;USA&dquo; and
&dquo;West Berlin&dquo; remains extremely negative.
Descriptions of methods used by Western
&dquo;espionage&dquo; and &dquo;seduction&dquo; agencies is
supplemented by adding kidnapping to the
list of methods they supposedly employ.
The treatment of the refugee problem re-
mains the same during this period as in July,
but tone and intensity of engagement become
hysterical.
3. Conclusion. If one takes these qualitative
impressions and adds them to the results of
the more structured evaluative assertion anal-
ysis, it seems justified to conclude that, during
the investigated period, an attitude change
toward the refugees did indeed take place.
The press valuation becomes more and more
hostile. As the date for the closing of the
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border approaches, the attitude of Neues
Deutschland toward the refugees becomes
more and more hysterically aggressive. It is
in this sense that we will interpret the results
in the later overview of all the data.
ACTION INDICATORS; METHOD
OF INVESTIGATION
Hypothesis 2b states that the date of vio-
lent action approaches when the arguments
which demand or imply action increase. To
test this hypothesis, all relevant articles in
our period of investigation (May 1 to August
13) were examined for action indicators.
1. Definition of &dquo;action indicator. &dquo; The
following categories of press statements were
considered &dquo;action indicators&dquo;: (a) announce-
ments of government actions; (b) announce-
ments of actions by factory committees, com-
munities, and other organizations; (c) pro-
grammatic statements by politicians, journal-
ists, professors, etc.; (d) demands made by
the population in letters to the editor; and
(e) demands coming from factories, collec-
tivized farms, and other organizations in the
form of resolutions.
2. Procedure. Within our period of inves-
tigation the first action indicator appears on
June 17, 1961 in a statement by Walter Ul-
bricht during a press conference. From this
week on, closeness to the date of action, mea-
sured in weeks, was placed in relation to the
number of action indicators in a given week.
The statistical method used was Spearman’s
rank-order correlation (Guilford, 1956).
ACTION INDICATORS:
RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
Table 10 presents the relevant data. Col-
umn 2 gives the weekly number of articles
containing action indicators. In the next col-
umn the total number of refugee-related
articles for that week is given. The last col-
umn states the percentage of all weekly ar-
ticles containing action indicators.
TABLE 10
RELATION BETWEEN THE CLOSENESS OF THE
DATE OF ACTION AND THE NUMBER OF
WEEKLY ARTICLES CONTAINING
ACTION INDICATORS
Correlating closeness to date of action and
number of weekly action indicators yields a
coefficient of rho = 0.86 (p < 0.01). If one
compares closeness and percentage, the coef-
ficient of correlation is rho = 0.58 (0.10 >
p > 0.05). Since it is not assumed that articles
containing action indicators are distributed
randomly, it does not seem plausible to say
that just because more is written, the likeli-
hood of encountering a certain argument is
also increased. Thus we do not argue that the
increase in action indicators is just a byprod-
uct of the general upswing in press activity,
but conclude that as the date of action ap-
proaches the argumentation points more and
more toward action, although this trend is
partly hidden by the increase in total press
activity.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:
METHOD AND RESULTS
According to Hypothesis 2c a third cri-
terion for the closeness of the date of action
is the fact that the press begins to print let-
ters to the editor. Not all of these letters are
at the same time action indicators, since not
all demand explicitly government measures.
But as voices of the people, be they spon-
taneous or ordered, they seem singularly
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suited to illustrate the necessity for action
and to document the legitimacy of any step
that might follow. Such letters should be most
effective shortly before the date of action-
otherwise they might be forgotten. Conse-
quently, the printing of the letters should
become a clue to the closeness of the date of
action.
Within the period relevant for the testing
of this hypothesis (May 1-August 13), no
letters relating to the refugee problem are
printed before July 12. In contrast, during
the period from July 12 to August 13 relevant
letters are found in thirteen editions of Neues
Deutschland. The letters suggest solutions
to the problem; they greet and applaud gov-
ernment measures against the Grenzganger,
and they demand further action. The most
extreme examples are to be found in the edi-
tions of July 30, August 5, and August 12.
In order to test whether these thirteen edi-
tions containing letters to the editor were
equally distributed over the total period of 33
days or whether they appeared with greater
frequency in the early days of August, a chi-
square test with Yates correction was made.
Table 11 shows the distribution of the data.
TABLE 11 I
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLOSENESS TO THE
DATE OF ACTION AND PRINTING OF
REFUGEE-RELATED LETTERS
TO THE EDITOR
Chi2 = 10.19, p < .01
There is indeed a relationship between the
printing of refugee-related letters to the edi-
tor in Neues Deutschland and the closeness of
the date of action; we therefore consider
Hypothesis 2c supported by the data.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: DESCRIPTION
Beginning with July 1, the most sought-
after consumer goods-TV sets, refrigerators,
cars, etc.-were sold only to persons who
could prove that they were employed in the
GDR. This new regulation was directed
against the Grenzgänger and threatened their
standard of living. The measure was not pub-
lished until July 12. When it did, finally, ap-
pear in the newspaper, it was placed on the
same page with letters to the editor applaud-
ing the new restriction. The fact that a mea-
sure in effect since July 1 is first published
two weeks later and then together with ap-
proving comments made by the people can
hardly be understood as other than an at-
tempt to justify a government action.
The first demand for further &dquo;effective
measures of the government&dquo; appears in the
edition of July 30, two weeks before the
building of the Wall. A community commit-
tee demands, &dquo;Stop the commuting once and
for all!&dquo; In the first days of August, Neues
Deutschland prints new suggestions by the
people practically daily. On August 5, seem-
ingly in response, the government puts a new
measure into effect: retroactively from August
1, Grenzgänger have to pay rent and utilities
in Deutschmark-West (applauding letters fol-
low three days later under the headline &dquo;The
time was more than ripe&dquo;). A news item of
the same day, &dquo;Two hundred and twenty-
eight Grenzganger have returned,&dquo; supposedly
demonstrates the effectiveness of the measure.
On August 11, Neues Deutschland reports
the beginning of the registration of all
Grenzgänger. Also on this date, several fac-
tory committees demand &dquo;effective measures
for the protection of the population.&dquo; De-
mands now go beyond the group of Grenz-
gänger. The next day, August 12, there ap-
pears under the headline &dquo;The people’s will
on the agenda&dquo; a report on the meeting of the
Volkskammer (parliament) urging the govern-
ment to apply stern measures and assuring
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the leaders of the full confidence of the peo-
ple. This line is further emphasized by a
resolution taken by construction workers in
Dresden and published the same day: &dquo;Every
action of the government has our confi-
dence.&dquo; On August 13th, the border is closed.
As a result of the qualitative analysis of
the press arguments one can conclude: ( 1 )
The attitude of Neues Deutschland toward the
refugees becomes increasingly hostile as the
date of action approaches. (2) As the date
of action approaches there is an increase in
the number of arguments hinting at action.
(3) The printing of letters to the editor in-
creases as the date for the building of the
Wall comes nearer. (4) The last weeks before
the date of action are characterized by an ex-
treme intensity of newspaper activity, an
intensity of engagement that can hardly be
called anything but hysterical.
Relationship between Intensity
of Press Activity and Number
of Refugees
The third hypothesis states that there will
be a significant positive relationship between
the number of refugees and the intensity of
the press activity. This hypothesis rests on
two considerations: ( 1 ) the thought that a
complex industrialized social system cannot
afford to solve social conflict without using
manipulation, and (2) the assumption that
the intensity of the manipulation will be in-
fluenced by the severity of the problem.
PRESS ACTIVITY AND REFUGEES:
METHOD OF INVESTIGATION
1. The period of study. We assume that
press activity and number of refugees are
interdependent variables. But we also assume
that the process of mutual influence is trig-
gered by the increase in number of refugees.
We hope to support this idea by starting our
comparison two months before the decisive
upswing in the number of refugees. When
during two months preceding the upswing
the press treatment of the refugee problem
remains uniformly low, then it seems correct
to conclude that the upswing was not caused
by an increase in press activity (since there
was none). The time span of two months
seemed sufficiently long to establish a trend
against which later increases could be mea-
sured. Since the decisive upswing in the num-
ber of refugees occurs in July 1961, the start-
ing point for the test of this hypothesis is
again May 1, 1961.
2. The procedure. The index of press activ-
ity is the weekly sum of lines. In all there are
fifteen weekly sums. These sums are corre-
lated with the number of refugees in the same
week. The method of correlation is Spear-
man’s rank-order correlation. It is advisable
to use this method since the relationship be-
tween press activity and number of refugees
over the total period is not a linear one
(Guilford, 1956; Lienert, 1962).
The procedure was similar to the one fol-
lowed earlier. At first all refugee-related ar-
ticles were identified and their lines counted.
This information was entered into the pre-
pared form. Finally, the weekly sums of lines
and the weekly numbers of refugees were
correlated.
There remains a complication that has to be
considered. In principle there should exist a
latency period. If one assumes that it is the
number of refugees which determines the
activity level of the press, then one should
not expect the press to react without delay.
After all, articles responding to the migra-
tions have to be written and approved before
being published. Even if one assumes that
causation is reversed and that it is the activity
of the press which influences people in their
decision to flee, a latency period should be
assumed. Certainly, it is not an easy decision,
and a lot of logistic details have to be settled
before a person or family can leave. However,
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if the relationship between the variables is
one of mutual influence, then the effect of
these latency periods should cancel out. This
conclusion was supported by a check. Prag-
matically, we correlated assuming latency
periods of varying length and varying direc-
tion. When all the resulting correlations
were smaller than when we correlated without
assuming any latency period, we concluded
that the process was indeed one of mutual
influence and that the latency periods which
logically must exist cancel each other out in
their effect. Table 12 presents the relevant
information.
Furthermore, we should point out two
sources of error in the data: (1) We do not
know whether refugees who are tabulated on
a given date accomplished their flight that
same day or a day or more earlier. Refugee
numbers were never tabulated on Sundays
and holidays, for example. (2) It is unlikely
that the East German authorities learned of
each flight immediately; certainly there was
some delay and lack of reporting. Indeed,
there are indications that East German au-
thorities depended for information at least to
some extent upon West German figures. We
decided to proceed on the assumption that
the two sources of error were of comparable
magnitude and would cancel each other out.
The fact that the correlation of refugees and
newspaper lines within the same week yields
the closest association seems to justify this
decision.
PRESS ACTIVITY AND REFUGEES:
RESULTS OF THE CORRELATION
Table 13 presents the data that were com-
pared. The correlation between weekly line
counts and number of refugees is rho = 0.89
(p < 0.01). The correlation between the num-
ber of articles and the number of refugees is
also significant (rho = 0.84, p < 0.01).
Thus we conclude that there is indeed a
strong positive relationship between the in-
tensity of press activity and the number of
refugees, demonstrating that the press-at
least in this instance-mirrors the severity of
the social problem.
DETERMINATION OF THE TRIGGERING
FACTOR
The rank-order correlation has shown that
a relationship between the variables exists.
This, however, does not answer the question
whether the upswing in number of refugees
triggers the increase in press activity or
whether the activity of the press is respon-
sible for the increased flow of refugees. We
assumed that the process of mutually influ-
encing each other would be started by the
upswing in number of refugees.
Figure 5 seems to support this assumption.
The flow of refugees remains roughly at the
TABLE 12
CORRELATION OF LINE COUNT AND NUMBER OF REFUGEES ASSUMING
LATENCY PERIODS OF VARYING LENGTH
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TABLE 13
WEEKLY LINE COUNT AND WEEKLY NUMBERS OF REFUGEES
IN THE PERIOD MAY 1 AUGUST 13
same level until the tenth week but increases
markedly from the tenth to the eleventh week.
In contrast, press activity remains constant
during the first eleven weeks. Only in the
twelfth week is there a noticeable increase in
the number of lines. At this point, then, the
data themselves suggest a latency period. It
seems as if Neues Deutschland reacted to the
FIG. 5. Movement of weekly numbers of refugees and weekly number of lines in the period May
1 to August 13, 1961.
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increase in number of refugees with a delay of
one week.
Can the impression suggested by Figure 5
be secured statistically? Yes, by testing the
following three specific statements:
(1) The number of refugees in the eleventh
week differs significantly from that in the first
through tenth week.
(2) The line count in the eleventh week
does not differ significantly from that in the
first through tenth week.
(3) The line count in the twelfth week does
differ significantly from that in the first
through tenth week.
These statements can be tested with the
help of a method of trend change analysis
suggested by Augsberger (1956), a parametric
method based on the assumption of linear
trends. The first value that seems to deviate
from the original trend is compared with a
t-test to the value that would be expected had
the trend continued unchanged. It is true that
we don’t consider the refugee-related articles
to be distributed normally. We have used,
therefore, nonparametric methods wherever
possible. But since we do not know of any
nonparametric method of trend change anal-
ysis that would suit our question, and since
the t-test has been shown to be relatively
invariant against deviations from normal
distribution (Boneau, 1960), we decided to
use Augsberger’s method anyhow. Table 14
presents the relevant information.
On the basis of this trend analysis we can
reject the hypothesis that an increase in press
activity has triggered an upswing in number
of refugees. Increase in press activity does not
precede but rather follows the upswing. More-
over, the data do not contradict the hypo-
thesis that increase of the flow of refugees
activates the press. A stronger statement,
however, is not possible on the basis of these
data. Other interpretations can be suggested.
For example, it could have been that in the
week of July 17 the order went out to con-
TABLE 14
COMPARISON OF THE OBSERVED AND
EXPECTED NUMBERS OF REFUGEES
AND LINES IN THE FIRST THROUGH
TWELFTH WEEKS
centrate on the refugee problem in prepara-
tion for the upcoming date of action. Without
access to archives in the GDR it will be dif-
ficult to test such alternative hypotheses.
Summary and Interpretation
( 1 ) On the basis of the data it seems im-
probable that the press undertook its attempt
to stop the stream of refugees with the help
of a propaganda campaign before the decision
to close the border was made. The Marxist-
Leninist theory of journalism clearly demands
that the press be used as an instrument for
influencing behavior. It seems plausible to
think that the press had despaired. Migration
was an old problem and it had become very
clear over the years what was necessary to
stop the drainage: Every time the regime had
slackened in its pursuit of unpopular goals the
number of refugees had decreased, for ex-
ample, in 1953 after the introduction of the
&dquo;new course.&dquo; Therefore all that was neces-
sary to reduce the flow was to keep the po-
litical development in harmony with the
wishes, and even prejudices, of the people.
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But exactly this happened less often in the
GDR than in other countries of the Eastern
bloc, for example, in Poland. In the GDR
ideological postulates practically always had
priority. The authorities presumed to know
what was right, and were quite ready to force
their &dquo;happiness&dquo; on the people. However,
manipulation is a matter of small steps and
the success of any attempt to manipulate be-
havior depends on the degree to which the
wishes and problems of the people are taken
into account. It was such consideration for
the people that was too often lacking in the
GDR, presumably for ideological reasons.
Rigidity of an ideological position prevented
a pragmatic and detached discussion of the
problem, and, consequently, the use of ex-
actly those arguments which might have been
suited to swing the mood of the population.
This seems important, for one can general-
ize and say that the press in totalitarian
systems in general may not be able to manipu-
late behavior in any decisive way; it is re-
stricted in its choice of arguments, because
the realm of principal state interests and
ideological taboos seems far greater in these
systems than in the parliamentary forms of
government in the West, and the leeway for
pragmatic arguments and bargains is corre-
spondingly smaller.
A further consideration might support this
conclusion: In a situation of basic conflict,
where the state is not believed to act in a given
person’s interest, it is psychologically improb-
able to expect him to follow the influence
attempts of an agent clearly allied with the
state. Only a mediator could gain enough
authority to persuade the people to alter their
behavior. The press can function as such a
mediator but only if it is recognized by the
people as an independent source of power
capable of advocating a course of action that
does justice to both parties of the conflict.
Under such conditions the press would have
at least &dquo;expert power&dquo; (French and Raven,
1959). Its influence over the people would
increase if it also had &dquo;referent power&dquo;-i.e.,
a record of defending the people against the
long arm of the state. In totalitarian systems
where the course of action is so greatly in-
fluenced by ideological postulates, always
with the readiness to enforce them even
against the will of the people, and in which
the press is defined as an instrument of the
leadership, the mass media cannot play a
mediator role and are consequently limited in
their ability to manipulate behavior in the
case of conflict.
Other reasons can be added. For example,
totalitarian systems seem less interested in
leading people toward desired decisions than
to keep them from making undesired reac-
tions to decisions made without their partici-
pation. Inkeles (1950) and Janowitz (1961)
point further to the people’s satiation with
propaganda and its lack of credibility as rea-
sons for the fact that the press has compara-
tively little influence on the manipulation
of behavior in totalitarian systems.
(2) It is the conclusion of this study and the
opinion of all other sources used that it was
the function of the press to justify a planned
action and to prepare the population as well
as the outside world for its coming. The
change in argumentation, the increase of ac-
tion indicators, and the manipulation of
letters to the editor all speak for the fact that
the preparation was planned and directed. It
is interesting to note in this connection that
the press had already begun preparing for the
action at a time when the member states of the
Warsaw Pact had not yet given their permis-
sion to build the Wall. Whether this was the
anticipation of a decision expected to come,
or whether it was a push forward to force the
Kremlin to consent, cannot be decided.
(3) Determining the success of press prep-
aration is largely a matter for speculation.
To be sure, there was no revolt. Foreign
politicians, for example Senator Fulbright,
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began to consider a closing of the border as
negotiable. The world did expect something
to happen. In this sense, there was indeed a
preparation. But to what extent it was due to
the working of the press, and especially to
the press treatment of the refugee problem,
cannot be decided on the basis of these data.
The GDR as a state appears to have had
neither achievement, nor promise, nor Nest-
warme (warmth of the hearth) enough to bind
its people in any way other than force. Force
was applied to give a new ideology a chance
to live. Whether such a last resort was jus-
tified is not a scientific question, and there
one will have to take sides.
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